Private bourse dispute-resolution and secrecy keep the diamond trade extralegal and low-breach.

Evidence

Ar subsrage (b), if either player has failed to query the Law Merchant or if the query establishes that at least one player has an outstanding judgment, then both traders play Cheat (which we may interpret as a refusal by the honest trader to trade); otherwise, both play Honest. … Ar subsrage (c), if both parties queried at substage (a) and exactly one of the two players Cheated at substage (b), then the victim appeals to the LM; otherwise, no appeal is filed. … At subsrage (d), if a valid appeal was filed, the LM awards damages of J to the aggrieved party. … At subsrage (e), the defendant pays the judgment J if and only if he has no other outstanding judgments. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 95 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Most diamond industry disputes are resolved without formal adjudication.; Transaction costs do not explain the diamond trade’s extralegal contracts. — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 137; Secrecy norms drive the bourse to prefer extralegal agreements over enforceable contracts. (+10 more)

Related

• The diamond trade sustains an extralegal contractual regime through private arbitration and reputational enforcement. (similarity 0.82)
• Private dispute resolution excels through speed, low cost, and secrecy. (similarity 0.81)
• Diamond industry’s private law succeeds by enforcing judgments faster than courts. (similarity 0.80)
• Pre-arbitration conciliation resolves most diamond-industry disputes. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• A Law Merchant institution can sustain honest trade as an equilibrium #corroborates (0.80) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 95