Privacy matters beyond secrecy because surveillance of legal acts chills free expression

Evidence

Privacy theorists Daniel Solove, Priscilla Regan, and Helen Nissenbaum all argue that conceptualizing privacy as secrecy ignores the myriad of other reasons that privacy is necessary. Solove writes: β€œEven surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in them. The value of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply by focusing on the particular individuals who are deterred from exercising their rights. Chilling effects harm society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity.” Allowing absolute electronic surveillance limits government and corporate accountability, creates an imbalance of power, and, overall, compromises social freedom. When Γ‡elik or Larson idealize living in public, they are not talking about complete disclosure of personal information, but instead transparency along specific lines, namely drug use and sexuality. The belief that these aspects of life should be publicized, however, has an ideological function. β€” Alice E. Marwick, Status Update, 619

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the chilling-effects argument and distinguishes privacy-as-secrecy from privacy-as-social-necessity.
  • XREF: The Solove chilling-effects framework connects to freedom-of-information debates and surveillance studies. β€” connects to: Privacy policies function as surveillance policies in practice β€” Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 782; Debate over surveillance centered on scope, secrecy, and oversight; Surveillance erodes interpersonal trust by removing the right to act without it β€” Nick Couldry & Ulises A. Mejias, The Costs of Connection: How Data Is…, 503 (+4 more)

Broader Connections