Prejudice becomes recognized as a social problem only when role agitation is widespread.

Evidence

Furthermore, the role-incongruity framework is consistent with Allport’s insight that in times of social stability, prejudice is latent in the beliefs and feelings toward social groups in that it is unlikely to become an acknowledged social issue if most group members remain in traditional roles (see Allport’s ch. 14). Yet, our approach explains Allport’s (1954/1979) insight that ā€œheterogeneity and the urge toward upward mobility thus make for ferment in society and are likely to bring ethnic prejudice in their wakeā€ (p. 224): Group members are perceived to be adapted to their accustomed social roles and therefore seem unqualified for new roles with different demands. The prejudice against these potential role occupants, however, goes unrecognized unless agitation for roles is at least moderately widespread. Therefore, in popular and social-scientific discourse, ā€œgender prejudiceā€ is understood to refer to prejudice against women, many of whom have been striving to attain new roles. Similarly, as Blacks attempt to obtain roles that have been dominated by Whites, ā€œracial prejudiceā€ has come to refer to prejudice against Blacks. In this vein, Allport’s focus on racism and omission of sexism ironically illustrate his point that prejudices, though they exist before they are ā€œproblematized,ā€ become recognized as prejudices only when social movements challenge the status quo. The Civil Rights movement was beginning to present this challenge when Allport was writing his book, whereas the feminist movement became culturally salient only later. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 214

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: Dense and paradigm-shifting: the argument that prejudice is only recognized as such once social movements challenge the status quo, and that Allport’s own tacit omitting of sexism proves the point, is a genuinely subtle recursive insight.
  • XREF: Connects to the broader literature on ā€˜problematization’ as a social construction, and to the moral-panic literature on how threats come to be seen as social problems only under specific conditions.