Precautionary ozone policy succeeded precisely by distrusting risk-assessment tools

Evidence

Signifi cantly, though, precautionary wisdom emerged at the time of that action from a po liti cal body that saw itself as standing outside of, and being critically disposed toward, its tools of risk assessment and welfare maximization. Indeed, at the time that the United States led the global effort to reduce the use of ozonedepleting substances, computer programs were rejecting satellite data on the extent of loss in the ozone layer as being too far from the range of expected results to be valid. Nevertheless, given the monumental potential harms at stake, the United States accepted present economic costs in order to eliminate the possibility of an ozone catastrophe and eventually convinced the rest of the industrialized world to follow its precautionary lead. — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere, 135

Categorization

• QUESTION: An excellent concrete anchor case for interrogating when model-validity filters failed — connects to broader critiques of statistical gatekeeping.
• XREF: Echoes the standing note that statistical objectivity rests on unwarranted assumptions about the physical world; the ozone computer rejection is a case example. — connects to: Statistical objectivity in environmental policy rests on unwarranted assumptions about the physical world — Douglas A. Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental…, 15; Delayed environmental harms create regulatory cost-asymmetry and uncertainty — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 306; Short-term profit incentives override distant and slowly accumulating environmental harms (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Short-term profit incentives override distant and slowly accumulating environmental harms #complicates (0.80)
• Environmental policymaking systematically discounts distant-future and foreign benefits against present domestic costs #qualifies (0.78) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 562
• Delayed environmental harms create regulatory cost-asymmetry and uncertainty #qualifies (0.75) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 306