Pre-emptively garrisoning old rebel strongholds drove resistance to new refuges

Evidence

The Spanish military deployment, intended to ensure that those deported went quietly, was sufficiently powerful to crush any stand made by the Moriscos, if one were undertaken, but the authorities wanted above all to prevent any risk of trouble developing. To that end, Pedro de Toledo, with 550 of the best troops brought across from Italy at an early stage, set about occupying strong points in the Sierra de Espad´an, places where, in the past, rebels had been known to seek refuge. The move was ill-advised: what happened was that those Moriscos determined to make a military stand chose other inaccessible mountain fastnesses instead. — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 1456

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to counterinsurgency pattern where predictable tactics displace rather than eliminate resistance — same dynamic as the Armada-era garrison theories, and a recurring theme of how preemptively occupying expected positions backfires.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — L. P. Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500 to 1614, 1456