Power must be theorized indirectly through society as its condition of possibility

Evidence

There is first the possibility of examining such conceptual frameworks directly in terms of their logical consistency, of the possibilities of verification they offer, of difficulties in measurement and, finally, of their conceptual predilections. Up to the present at least, this approach has led to fragmentation of the theory of power rather than to its consolidation. This appears to be the consequence of over-hasty theorizing about one phenomenon in isolation. Alternatively, one could make use of a sociological technique (of proven value ever since Durkheim) of framing questions so as to reveal the basic premises of the institutions of the lifeworld, their existing interpretations and understandings. The questions might be the following: If power has to be a causal process, what non-causal foundations of causality are there? If power is to be reckoned with as exchange, what non-exchangeable foundations are there for exchange? If power is a game played between opponents, what are the non-game-playing foundations of the game? This question-framing technique refers back to society as a condition of the possibility of power, and seeks a theory of power indirectly, by way of a theory of society. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 582

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The ‘non-X foundations of X’ question framing is a genuinely distinctive analytical move — turning every causal/exchange/game account of power back onto its own presupposed social substrate. This is the methodological core readers would want to sit with.
• XREF: This ‘conditions of possibility’ framing anticipates Giddens’s structuration (structure as both medium and outcome) and directly supports the reader’s project of tracing how institutional hierarchy conditions Stevens’s deference. — connects to: Power-legitimation must come from within democracy itself once unifying worldviews fade — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 92