Populism is a permanent possibility of political structuration, not a deviance
Evidence
It is evident that my objective in questioning Minogue’s distinctions – which are just examples of widespread attitudes in relation to populism – has been, to a large extent, to invert the analytical perspective: instead of starting with a model of political rationality which sees populism in terms of what it lacks – its vagueness, its ideological emptiness, its anti-intellectualism, its transitory character – to enlarge the model or rationality in terms of a generalized rhetoric (what, as we shall see, can be called ‘hegemony’) so that populism appears as a distinctive and always present possibility of structuration of political life. An approach to populism in terms of abnormality, deviance or manipulation is strictly incompatible with our theoretical strategy. — Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 46
Categorization
- recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
- XREF: connects to: Dichotomous simplification and imprecision are the very condition of political action — Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 62; Fascism becomes intelligible only when condemnation yields to explanation. — Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 486; Laclau defined populism as the unification of demands against a power bloc — Arthur Borriello and Anton Jäger, The Populist Moment: The Left After the…, 76 (+7 more)
Broader Connections
- Populist reason is political reason itself, not a deviant form.
#corroborates(0.95) — Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, 444 - Populism can be mobilized either against or in service of the power bloc
#qualifies(0.72)