Popper located objectivity in science’s institutions, not individual minds

Evidence

Equally mistaken in Popper’s view was Mannheim’s conception of knowledge: like Polanyi, Popper emphasized the personal elements of scientific knowledge and discovery. “What the ‘sociology of knowledge’ overlooks,” he wrote in Poverty of Historicism, “is … the fact that it is the public character of science and of its institutions which imposes a mental discipline upon the individual scientist, and which preserves the objectivity of science and its tradition of critically discussing new ideas.” — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 87

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies the epistemic foundation Popper opposed to Mannheim’s knowledge sociology
• XREF: Resonates with the reader’s prior work on trust and institutions as knowledge-bearers, e.g. social capital and law-merchant literature — connects to: Popper restricted scientific progress to the context of refutation — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,…, 2417; Science’s trustworthiness rests on being intersubjective and collective — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice: How to Communicate…, 748; Social structures are objectivated meanings built through inter-subjective exchange

Broader Connections

• Popper restricted scientific progress to the context of refutation #expands (0.85) — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 2417
• Science’s trustworthiness rests on being intersubjective and collective #corroborates (0.80) — Holm Gero Hümmler, Ulrike Schiesser, Fact and Prejudice, 748
• Social structures are objectivated meanings built through inter-subjective exchange #expands (0.75)