Poor clients’ agency involvement is nonvoluntary when no real alternatives exist

Evidence

The distrust of the Russian state agencies that oversaw the economy during its woeful years includes, rightly, distrust of many of the officers of those agencies. To give them proper incentives for behaving constructively might require massive organizational redesign. As is commonly true, they seem to have come to view their interests as tied to the interests of their organization rather than to the interests of their clientele. This can happen simply because it is within the organization that they are rewarded, so that it is their organization and not their clientele who give them their incentives for action or inaction. This problem is exacerbated when there is the credible threat that some of these institutions will be abolished. Hence I cannot trust the agents—because I believe their interests do not encapsulate mine. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 767 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

These cases can occur when (1) agency relationships are not embedded in networks of social relations, (2) relationships are episodic rather than continuing, (3) principals are “one-shotters” and agents “repeat-players,” (4) principals cannot evaluate agent performance (because they lack access or expertise, are literally incompetent, or are committed to futures transactions and necessarily await delivery on agent promises), (5) agents have actual possession of principals’ property (and, therefore, exit may not be a viable option for aggrieved principals), or (6) agency offerings are not easily rescinded or reversed (e.g., surgery). — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 55 (#expands, via linked claim)

Third, street-level bureaucrats convey to clients what their proper level of expectations of the bureaucracy should be. This is complicated because at one level the society generally teaches that citizens have a right to equal treatment and responsive services. The ideology of public service urges people to seek safety, health care, education, and other objectives from public agencies. Diffuse public awareness that bureaucracies are characterized by red tape, inefficiency, corruption, and bungling helps to deBate expectations, but it does not do so entirely, since individuals can still hope for and seek out responsive treatment. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 486 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source
• XREF: connects to: Client neglect stems from nonvoluntary dependency, not worker class prejudice alone; Claims of client incapacity rest on untested assumptions rather than nurtured-involvement experience — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 1501; Poor people’s agency involvement is involuntary when no real alternative exists. — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of…, 348 (+3 more)

Related

• Organizationally-aligned incentives make state agents untrustworthy to their clients (similarity 0.83)
• Client neglect stems from nonvoluntary dependency, not worker class prejudice alone (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Trust-based agency relationships fail when the principal cannot exit or evaluate. #expands (0.85) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 55
• Organizationally-aligned incentives make state agents untrustworthy to their clients #corroborates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 767
• Social ideology of responsive service and cynicism about red tape jointly shape client expectations #qualifies (0.80) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 486