Political psychologists favor descriptive over normative models of decision-making

Evidence

Psychologists have generally regarded the assumptions of rational choice theory to be unrealistic in practice, and they have tended to take a descriptive (what people actually do) rather than normative (what people should do) approach. As Quattrone and Tversky demonstrate in Reading 14, there are a number of important ways in which actual decision-makers deviate from the strict standards of rationality. They offer prospect theory as a model for understanding a number of decision-making anomalies, especially preference reversals that arise from framing the same choice in terms of potential gains versus losses, and they discuss implications of the theory for incumbency effects in political elections. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 132

Categorization

• DEFINE: Draws the descriptive-versus-normative distinction in decision research and introduces prospect theory as the key alternative to rational choice.
• XREF: Connects to Kahneman and Tversky’s broader work on framing effects and loss aversion familiar from behavioral economics.