Political entry fees determine whether challengers resort to violent action

Evidence

Tilly begins with a simple conception of the polity. Polities have members, who have formal access to the political decision-making process, and challengers, who do not (Tilly, 1978, p. 53) All are contenders for power—with members, of course, enjoying privileges. Members use their resources in a game of continuous jockeying to enhance their power; challengers try, as a condition to all else, to get into the game. To be allowed to play, there are entrance fees. The higher the fees, the greater the pressure needed to become members; and at some point of cost-efficiency, violent action among contenders occurs, with revolution as the most extreme, but normal, form of such action. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4301 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: High entry costs to political membership push challengers toward violent action. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4301; Existing political institutions, not just pressure levels, shape contention. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 631; Legalizing demonstrations made claim-making less violent but more frequent — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 1326

Broader Connections

• High entry costs to political membership push challengers toward violent action. #expands (0.95) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4301