Philosophical propositions are fundamentally unreadable on first reading

Evidence

But how is the reading to be repeated? We have seen that the specific nature of the philosophical proposition lies in something which could not be available to the first reading. What seems obvious at the first grasp of the proposition is in reality its fundamental unreadability, because the propositional form is in conflict with ‘the unity of the concept [the dialectical identity of the terms] which destroys the form [of the proposition]’. To transform this first chaotic encounter with the objectivity of the text into a structure adequate to the philosophical proposition, to change it ‘right at the level of the form’ (an der Form), we cannot do this just by duplicating this experience of unreadability. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1215

Categorization

• XREF: The idea that a text is structured so it cannot be grasped at first encounter connects to Malabou’s later work on reading and to deconstruction (Derrida’s différance as deferral), though Malabou carefully distinguishes plasticity from difference. — connects to: Reading a speculative proposition requires transforming meaning through interpretation — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1225
• SEED: Angle: what would a pedagogy look like that treats its object as essentially only re-readable, never first-readable — the inverse of all introductory instruction.
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source

Broader Connections

• Reading a speculative proposition requires transforming meaning through interpretation #builds-on (0.50) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1225