Phenomenology describes the feel of thought rather than its content

Evidence

For phenomenology is precisely the attempt to tell not what a thought is, so much as what it feels like. It aims not at making statements about content (that being momentarily placed between parentheses), but at describing the mental operations which correspond to that content in all their temporal specificity. Its mode of proof, for the reader, consists not in logical argumentation, but rather in the shock, or the failure, of recognition. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 632

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines phenomenology by its mode of proof—recognition, not argument—which is the key to Jameson’s own method.
• XREF: The ‘shock of recognition’ echoes Benjamin’s shock aesthetics and Adorno’s essayistic method of knowledge-by-sudden-configuration. — connects to: The perceived intellectual reconciliation of philosophies is founded on a prior lived synthesis — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 421; Phenomenology investigates direct experience of phenomena rather than questions of reality — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 11; Phenomenology rediscovers philosophy by describing lived things rather than questioning reality — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 12 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Phenomenology investigates direct experience of phenomena rather than questions of reality #expands (0.80) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 11
• Phenomenology rediscovers philosophy by describing lived things rather than questioning reality #qualifies (0.75) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 12
• Phenomenology’s epoché can neutralize political and ideological dogmas by prioritizing direct experience #exemplifies (0.72) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 148