Phenomenological reduction yields a hybrid realm Adorno condemns as reified abstraction

Evidence

What remained after the phenomenological reduction was what was authentically experienced, what was genuinely objective, phenomena', the things themselves’. These were held to belong to an intermediate realm of awareness-of-things which belonged neither to the immanent sphere of consciousness nor to the transcendent outer world. This intermediate realm of awareness-of-things, with its `immanent transcendence’, was criticized by Adorno as being a combination of two abstractions: an abstraction from everything factual, in the concept of originally given phenomena, and an abstraction from the activity of thinking, corporeal individuals, in the concept of consciousness. Husserl had dissociated these abstractions from the things they were abstracted from. What resulted was the reification of abstraction. Consciousness was taking something as given because it had forgotten the part it played in creating it itself. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 561

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the phenomenological reduction, the ‘natural attitude’, and ‘immanent transcendence’ with reference-level precision — exactly the vocabulary a Critical Theory reader needs anchored.
• XREF: Anchors the Husserl-Adorno dispute that recurs across the reader’s whole Critical Theory shelf; connects to ‘The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance’.
• DEEPTHINKING: The ‘reification of abstraction’ formula — consciousness forgetting its own constitutive role — is a paradigm-level diagnosis worth sitting with.