People depend on one another for the very ability to think, not merely causally

Evidence

I argued in The Common Mind (1993, 1996) for a social philosophy that is at once anti-collectivist and anti-atomist. The philosophy is anti-collectivist in rejecting the idea that individuals are the playthings of aggregate social forces; they are not numbers in a game of historical chance, not pawns in a march to historical destiny. The philosophy is anti-atomist in insisting that nevertheless the notion of the solitary individual is essentially bogus: people depend on one another, and in more than a causal way, for the very ability to think; they are essentially social creatures. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 26

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s research on how shared positive projects build solidarity — this frames the communal constitution of individual agency itself, connecting to Pettit’s civic republicanism as a theory of freedom. — connects to: The individual’s inner mental relations mirror social relations among persons — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 354; Thought and ideas arise between self and world, not inside the individual — Jenny Odell, How to Do Nothing: Resisting the…, 484; Interpreting others presupposes shared rationality and a common world. — Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist…, 420 (+1 more)
  • DEFINE: Effectively defines the anti-collectivist/anti-atomist position that the republican framework builds on.

Broader Connections