People cling to self-interest vocabularies even when they contradict experienced motives

Evidence

If Seth goes to the basement and sees his daughter with a nail and a piece of wood in one hand and a hammer in the other, he assumes— almost always accurately—that she is going to pound the nail into the wood. Psychology has a rich literature, including patterns of errors, on attribution causes to dispositions rather than to perception–action dynamics in settings and situations that can cause and shape behavior (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 426 (#expands, via linked claim)

Consistent with Allport’s view on stereotype preservation, various studies on stereotype change have emphasized the active role that perceivers play in keeping their preconceptions intact. Kunda and Oleson (1995) found that the presence of an irrelevant piece of information facilitated perceivers’ work in fencing off the deviant. Initially neutral, the irrelevant information was now deemed to “explain” the deviance, allowing perceivers to keep their general expectations intact. Only when no irrelevant information was provided were perceivers forced to integrate the information about the deviant in their representation of the group as a whole. There are thus limits to people’s ability to bend reality. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1177 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Expressions of narrow self-interest are rhetorical performances rather than literal self-reports — Nina Eliasoph, “Close to home”: The work of avoiding…, 3; Irrelevant info is repurposed to explain away stereotype-disconfirming deviance — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1177; Self-interest shifts which stereotype category gets applied (+8 more)

Related

• People explain actions via inner dispositions rather than situational dynamics (similarity 0.82)
• Irrelevant info is repurposed to explain away stereotype-disconfirming deviance (similarity 0.79)
• People confirm their initial stereotypes by biased attention and interpretation (similarity 0.79)
• Stereotypes persist both from cognitive limits and from identity-serving motivations. (similarity 0.78)
• Stereotypes survive only when perceivers have spare cognitive resources (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• People explain actions via inner dispositions rather than situational dynamics #expands (0.80) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 426
• Irrelevant info is repurposed to explain away stereotype-disconfirming deviance #expands (0.75) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1177
• Counterexamples get fenced off as exceptions rather than revising stereotypes #expands (0.75)
• Self-interest shifts which stereotype category gets applied #expands (0.72)
• Perceivers choose among competing category labels to serve self-interest #expands (0.72)
• People strategically select which stereotype to apply based on self-interest #expands (0.72)
• Defaulting distrust of strangers follows from generalizing one’s own self-interested motives #complicates (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 757