People cannot will themselves into dispositions that will later act against their interests.

Evidence

David Gauthier (1986, chapter 6, especially 162), Edward McClennen (1990; but see Skyrms 1996), and others suppose that we can will ourselves to have a particular disposition that, in the future moment when we bring it to bear, is not in our interest. We might, for example, have to do this to secure a present benefit. Perhaps this is what Wagner meant Alberich to do. There are two distinct issues here: First, how can we make a bald commitment in a single interaction? Second, how can we make a bald commitment to behave generally in a certain way in potentially many interactions with different people in the future, as Alberich did? The latter is of central interest here, because the focus is on a disposition for trustworthiness in general. Most of us, however, would probably have to admit that we cannot readily or ever do such a thing. We might think ourselves capable of undying love for and commitment to, say, our child or parent, but we do not come by that love through mere decision, as Alberich supposedly came by his commitment. As Hume (1978 [1739–40], 3.2.5, page 517) says, with his usual confidence, “‘Tis certain we can naturally no more change our own sentiments, than the motions of the heavens.” With almost as much confidence, we can agree that he is surely right if he means merely by act of will. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 201

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Hardin/Luhmann integration project: the impossibility of self-willed disposition change is why trustworthiness must rest on observable constraints rather than internal commitment. — connects to: Newly articulated interests require virtuous people to press them — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1290
• DEFINE: Distinguishes a bald commitment in a single interaction from a general disposition toward trustworthiness — the latter being the analytically relevant case for trust theory.