People assume evil acts reveal an enduring core of evil in the actor

Evidence

Social psychological studies of causal explanations have traditionally been based on the distinction between “internal” and “external” attributions (e.g., Jones et al., 1972). In particular, when ordinary people observe an act by an individual, they tend to center their causal explanations on particular attributes or dispositions of the actor (i.e., internal attribution) as opposed to situational causes (Gilbert, 1998). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 111 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Where does it lie? What I suggest is that the prototypes we carry around about the sources of evil actions, which assign those actions to individuals who are themselves in some way intrinsically evil, causes us to ignore the more likely source of harmdoing actions, which is organizational in nature. If harmdoing actions are in the main committed by individuals caught up in organizations and their pathology, then prevention or amelioration of evil may be best done at the organizational level. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4037 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: People classify evil acts with certainty, consensus, and articulated principles; People default to explaining others’ acts through the actor’s disposition — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 111; Multiple consistent evil acts anchor attribution of evil to a person — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3877 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• People default to explaining others’ acts through the actor’s disposition #corroborates (0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 111
• Evil actions are societal products that transform ordinary individuals into evildoers #complicates (0.90)
• Evil acts mainly arise from organizational pathologies rather than intrinsically evil individuals #complicates (0.88) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4037
• Apparently evil acts can spring from genuine moral conviction #complicates (0.85)