Participation of nature is represented through human legal representatives, not direct voice

Evidence

The key capability related to participation is that of ‘control over one’s environment’. As noted above, Nussbaum insists that the most important thing here is a political conception and practice that respects animals, and is committed to treating them with justice. As with Fraser, there is a central connection between recognition and participation. Nussbaum only very briefly describes what she means by political participation for the nonhuman, and it is a very legalistic vision: entitlements that can be defended by human representatives, and property rights to the ‘territorial integrity’ of habitat. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 547

Categorization

• XREF: This ‘legalistic vision’ of proxy representation directly maps to the reader’s Legal Systems course—how civil-society actors like rivers and forests gain standing via guardians and trustees. — connects to: Nature’s agency need not be expressed through reason and speech — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 515; Proxies for nonhumans extend an established liberal practice of representation — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 677; Legal standing converts disregarded stewardship visions into audible voice — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,…, 1171 (+1 more)
• QUESTION: If nature’s participation runs only through human representatives and property rights, how close is it really to Fraser’s participatory parity? Worth chasing across the Legal Systems reading.