Palmerston saw Mehmed Ali’s monopolies as the lever to cripple his army

Evidence

Palmerston was constantly fed by Ponsonby’s alarming reports about the possibility of an Egyptian-Russian alliance. As a result of all these reports Palmerston became convinced that Mehmed Ali had expanded beyond the permissible. His mini-empire was threatening not only the Sultan’s but His (after 1837, Her) Britannic Majesty’s. The main beneficiary, Palmerston feared, would be the Czar, Emperor of all the Russias. But Palmerston could not devise a way of containing the Pasha of Egypt within his original pashalıks without, at the same time enhancing the power of either the Russians in Istanbul or the French in Cairo. This opportunity presented itself when he read the report that Bowring submitted upon his return from Egypt in 1839 in which he assumed a very positive tone on the vali’s policies in Egypt. Besides the tone, however, the one thing that mattered most to Palmerston was Bowring’s highlighting the fact that it was the monopolies that enabled the Pasha to finance his military machine. If only the Pasha could be forced to give up his monopolies, Palmerston thought, then his wings could be trimmed and thus India would be saved from the Russian menace. But the only person who could force the Pasha in this matter legally was the Sultan, and the Sultan of course was in no position to do so. — Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed Ali, his…, 1580

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in how Ottoman, British, and Egyptian actors intertwined — Palmerston’s strategic reasoning is the hinge.