Palmerston initially stayed silent during the first Syrian crisis.

Evidence

As mentioned in chapter 1 during the early months of the first crisis the British Foreign Secretary had almost nothing to say, apparently preferring to view the crisis as a purely Ottoman affair. “There is not a single word [from Palmerston] either to Constantinople and Alexandria or to the British ambassadors at Paris, Vienna, and St. Petersburg; hardly any observation can be noticed during 1832 on despatches coming from these centers and touching on the subject of the Syrian war.” This has prompted some historians to argue that Palmerston had not made up his mind yet as to which horse to back, as it were, the Sultan or Mehmed Ali. At this crucial time the question in Palmerston’s mind was: would British interests be harmed more if Mehmed Ali was opposed by Britain, which would cause him to be swayed even more towards France and therefore increase that country’s influence in Egypt, or if he were allowed to get away with his attack on the Sultan, thus jeopardizing the very existence of the Ottoman Empire? — Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed Ali, his…, 1570

Categorization

• QUESTION: When in 1832 did Palmerston settle on backing the Sultan, and what tipped him?