Oruka’s sage philosophy fails to decisively transcend ethnophilosophy

Evidence

Lansana Keita (1985) is quite sceptical of Oruka’s claim that philosophic sagacity is the movement best equipped to “give an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethnophilosphy.” Keita argues that Oruka’s claim is not fully defensible since it can be shown that philosophic sagacity, as defined by Oruka himself, seems to be an attempt at mere revision of the principles of ethnophilosophy. Moreover, an interesting phrase in Oruka’s definition above points to the fact that thoughts fluctuate between popular wisdom (what he likens to ethnophilosophy) and didactic wisdom (what he likens to the philosophic sages). While popular wisdom is conformist, didactic wisdom is at times critical of the communal set-up and popular wisdom. This distinction, in my opinion, is not clear and only justifies that the claim that philosophic sagacity is another form of ethnophilosophy. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 585

Categorization

• QUESTION: Does the popular/didactic wisdom distinction really collapse into ethnophilosophy, or does grounding in identifiable individuals genuinely change the epistemic status?