On the interference view, all law restricts liberty and freedom is only residual discretion.
Evidence
The Hobbesian conception of liberty leads Lind, as it led Hobbes, to maintain that all law infringes on people’s liberty. ‘All laws are coercive; the effect of them is either to restrain or to constrain; they either compel us to do or to forbear certain acts. The law which secures my property, is a restraint upon you; the law which secures your property, is a restraint upon me’ (p. 24). The supreme power in a free country— the legislature—protects the liberty of each, according to Lind, but only so far as it restrains or constrains others; by such restraint or constraint it gives each liberty ‘against all other subjects upon whom the law does operate’ (p. 70). — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 225
Categorization
- DEFINE: Lays out the inference that if liberty equals non-interference, then law necessarily trades liberty away — the view Pettit spends the book rebutting.
- XREF: connects to: Even prohibitions and coercion cannot limit freedom; only being-objectified by another can. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1230
Broader Connections
- Even prohibitions and coercion cannot limit freedom; only being-objectified by another can.
#contradicts(0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1230