Occupational licensing originated as workers’ substitute for union power

Evidence

There are good historical reasons for the difference between the two types of agency. Licensing of plumbers was probably the plumbers’ own idea. They wanted to keep out amateurs, enhance their own prestige, control the work, and hold prices steady and sta­ ble. These are mostly economic goals, not very different from some of the goals of labor unions or of workers generally. But not all occupations are able to band together and form an effective union. Against whom could druggists, doctors, or plumbers call a strike? Whom could they ask for a raise? They can best achieve results by forming trade groups and by persuading the legislature to license their occupation, vesting in a board of practitioners the power to decide who gets licenses, and how and why. This puts control of membership and work conditions firmly in friendly hands. — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law, 581

Categorization

• XREF: Offers a clear causal origin story for licensing regimes — connects to standard political economy material on rent-seeking and professional capture. — connects to: Regulated industries often capture their own regulators — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 583; Occupational licensing laws mainly served organized trades’ economic self-interest. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2004

Broader Connections

• Occupational licensing laws mainly served organized trades’ economic self-interest. #complicates (0.78) — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2004