Norms of honor only bind when violations are publicly observable

Evidence

Even if there were a widely held norm of trustworthiness, it would commonly run into alternative motivations. For example, suppose Karamazov’s lieutenant colonel thought Trifonov should be bound by a norm of trustworthiness, a variant of a norm of honor. Against his hopes, note that the force of a norm of honor derives from the potential public disgrace from dishonor, as in the case of the dueling norm, which is a norm of honor (Hardin 1995, 91–100). Trifonov was not under a norm of honor of such force if for no other reason than that his actions were not on public display and could not be if it were up to the lieutenant colonel, who therefore was helpless to call on enforcement of the norm. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 272

Categorization

• XREF: Directly connects to the reading purpose: Trifonov’s escape from the norm because his actions weren’t observable parallels how white blindness removes observability and collapses norm enforcement — Saramago’s central mechanism. — connects to: Conventions only confer status when performed publicly as signs — W. David Marx, Status and Culture: How Our Desire for…, 188