Normative reasons reshape preferences as much as factual information does

Evidence

Empiricists defend a non-cognitivist conception of practical reason that is supposed to be restricted to the capacity for rational choice and to making strategic decisions. According to this conception, one’s preferences can be influenced exclusively by better information about scopes for action and risks and by comparatively more reliable calculations of the consequences of possible alternative courses of action; however, they cannot be changed by taking the preferences of other participants into consideration. This restrictive view is counter-intuitive, because the reasons in terms of which we argue about the rightness of binding norms of action, or about which values are preferable, carry no less epistemic weight in the rationally motivated formation of preferences than information about facts. — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 60

Categorization

• XREF: The cognitivist vs. non-cognitivist split is the philosophical fault line between Habermas’s discourse ethics and rational-choice empiricism — connects to the reader’s deliberative-theory reading. — connects to: Norms and values can be cognitively examined, unlike bare preferences — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 61

Related

• Norms and values can be cognitively examined, unlike bare preferences (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Norms and values can be cognitively examined, unlike bare preferences #expands (0.75) — Jürgen Habermas, A New Structural Transformation of the…, 61