Nonsigner state provisions were inoperative by supremacy, not direct Sherman Act prohibition

Evidence

It follows from this that the Sherman Act did not apply directly to the non-signer provisions or te state air ra e c or these were provisions of officially-defined state law not of privately-defined contract law. Prior to the Miller-Tydings Act, these provisions were inoperative not because of direct federal prohibition but because of the general rule of federal-state relations, drawn from the supremacy clause, that state law may not attach enforceable legal consequences to activities or transactions which violate federal law. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 1914

Categorization

• XREF: Shows state law operating as a federal-defense/jurisdiction problem — connects to the whole polyad thread on legal institutions and federalism. — connects to: Early Sherman Act enforcement targeted the largest merged corporations and their abusive practices — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making…, 1136
• QUESTION: This supremacy-clause mechanism of state-law invalidity could merit a case-law follow-up on when state law ‘attaches consequences’ to federally lawful conduct.

Broader Connections

• Early Sherman Act enforcement targeted the largest merged corporations and their abusive practices #expands (0.72) — Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 1136