Non-member clients can negotiate the extent and frequency of mafia protection contracts

Evidence

That those who do not become members enjoy a range of protection contracts can be evinced from Calderone’s testimony: “[Gaetano] Graci was at first protected by Francesco Madonia, who, however, would intervene only in the most serious matters in order to ensure the smooth operation of his business… All the other major building contractors … had their protectors too, except for (Mariol Rendo, who preferred to let his employees deal with mafiosi” (AC: I, 19). Giuseppe Di Cristina, an ally of Giuseppe Calderone, is said by Antonio Calderone to have tried “to establish a permanent protection relationship with Rendo; but, as far as I know, he always refused to have any direct link with the underworld [malavita]. He preferred to go to the police, with whom he had established an excellent relationship. When it became inevitable, he used his employees to maintain contact” (AC: II, 549; see also Arlacchi 1992: chap. 17). These statements illustrate some important points: (I) it is possible for a client to negotiate the extent and frequency of mafia intervention; (2) mafiosi prefer long-term contracts; and (3) the police are seen as a competing supplier of protection. — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 417

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels Milgrom et al.’s private-judge model — clients choose contract intensity and may substitute police as a competing protection provider, exactly the ‘competing supplier’ structure of the law merchant.