No politically neutral premises exist from which liberal democracy can be justified to all

Evidence

For his pan, Richard Rony - who proposes a ‘nco-pragmatic’ reading of Wittgenstcin - has affirmed, taking issue with Apel and Habermas. that it is not possible to derive a universalistic moral philosophy from the philosophy of language. There is nothing. for him, in the nature of language that could serve as a basis for justifying to all possible audiences the superiority of liberal democracy. He declares: ‘We should have to abandon the hopeless task of finding politically neutral premises, premises which can be justified to anybody, from which to infer an obligation to pursue democratic politics.’ He considers that envisaging democratic advances as if they were linked to progress in rationality is not helpful, and that we should stop presenting the institutions of liberal western societies as the solution that other people wiD necessarily adopt when they cease to be ‘irrational’ and become ‘modern’. Following Wittgcnsrein, he sees the question at stake as one not of rationality but of shared beliefs. To call somebody irrational in this context, he states, ‘is not to say that she is not making proper use of her mental faculties. It is ooiy to say that she does not seem to share enough beliefs and desires with one to make conversation with her on the disputed point fiuitfu1.’ — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 300

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the pragmatic critique that calling someone irrational is a statement about shared beliefs, not mental faculties.
• QUESTION: If liberal democracy can only be justified by shared beliefs and not reason, what grounds Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism against a genuinely exclusionary rival?
• XREF: Rorty’s anti-foundationalism mirrors the reader’s test of whether a ‘we’ needs a permanent enemy to be sustained. — connects to: Liberal-democratic institutions cannot be given a context-independent rational foundation — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 297; No political consensus could exist free of exclusion — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 139; Liberalism is not actually impartial in theory or practice — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 357 (+7 more)

Broader Connections

• Liberalism is not actually impartial in theory or practice #corroborates (0.88) — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 357
• Liberal neutrality masks power by presenting exclusion as reason’s product #corroborates (0.87) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 135
• No political consensus could exist free of exclusion #corroborates (0.85) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 139
• No subject occupies a neutral position in the social order #corroborates (0.80)
• Democratic equality cannot exist without a correlate of inequality and exclusion #expands (0.78) — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 173
• Even Rousseau justifies democracy only negatively as non-violation #exemplifies (0.75) — Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos, 403
• Liberal thought assumes the world should conform to liberal premises #qualifies (0.72) — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 497
• Liberal democratic values are ambiguous and can legitimize domination #complicates (0.72) — Cristian Tileagă, The Nature of Prejudice, 114