No genuine pacification could be achieved in Algeria without a cease-fire.
Evidence
On the way de Gaulle had had an illuminating private conversation with a remarkable Muslim, Mahdi Belhaddad, a veteran who had lost his right arm at Cassino, currently sub-prefect of a one-horse town on the fringes of the Aurès, the only Muslim to hold such a post. Taking Belhaddad aside, the President had asked him for his views on the exposé of the situation that the local military had just given. Belhaddad began by complaining of the limitations imposed upon his own freedom of action, and at the fact that—after all the administrative reforms of the past years—there was still no other Muslim sub-prefect apart from himself, and that there was no Muslim in Delouvrier’s cabinet. He then offered the opinion that no genuine pacification could be achieved without a cease-fire. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1033
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the earlier chapters’ theme of pacification-through-force (Challe Plan in chapter 15) — a Muslim official directly contradicting the military’s doctrine. — connects to: De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957
Related
- De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress (similarity 0.81)
- By late 1958 Muslim sentiment had hardened toward independence (similarity 0.79)
- The barricades insurrection proved the decisive failure of the Algérie française cause. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- De Gaulle’s political successes could not translate into any Algerian peace progress
#corroborates(0.60) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 957