Neoliberal epistemology developed in pre-1935 philosophy-of-science debates as critical conventionalism.

Evidence

The limitation of human cognition is a leitmotif in neoliberal theory. The origin of the axiom that the mass of tacit human knowledge coordinated without direction by market actors trumps any attempt at centralized knowledge production, most often associated with Hayek, is rooted in debates in the philosophy of science dating before 1945. Martin Beddeleem’s chapter explains the innovative character and the strength of neoliberal epistemology vis-à-vis traditional liberal epistemologies of empiricism and naturalism (based on a priori assumptions) on the one hand, and universal positivist epistemologies prevalent in both socialist and conservative Vienna Circles on the other. Faced with the scientific and rationalist optimism of the unity of science movement as well as much of Marxism, a cohort of early neoliberal philosophers of science, including Michael Polanyi, Hayek, Karl Popper, and Louis Rougier, developed a new epistemology of critical conventionalism. Separating the spheres of lawful exact knowledge from social spheres in which precise knowledge was impossible due to the dispersed, tacit, and opaque character of the subject, neoliberals intervened in the fields of both epistemology and public policy. Arguing for the unavoidability of human ignorance became an important precondition for granting the market (and, by extension, its most powerful actors) superior powers of cognition and coordination. — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 34

Categorization

• DEFINE: Names ‘critical conventionalism’ and locates Hayek’s knowledge axiom in pre-1945 philosophy-of-science debate, not just economics.
• XREF: Contradicts the crude view of Hayek’s knowledge argument as a standalone response to mid-century socialism; connects to the reader’s library on Cold War intellectual history. — connects to: Neoliberal epistemology drew on Poincaré’s conventionalism to attack socialist rationalism — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 62; Neoliberalism’s critique of rival ideologies drew on epistemological conventionalism — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 62; Neoliberalism reframed politics as an epistemological question of what can be known — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Early neoliberals rejected empiricism for a critical conventionalism of knowledge. #corroborates (0.95) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 90
• Neoliberal epistemology drew on Poincaré’s conventionalism to attack socialist rationalism #corroborates (0.90) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 62
• Neoliberalism’s critique of rival ideologies drew on epistemological conventionalism #corroborates (0.88) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 62
• Neoliberalism reframed politics as an epistemological question of what can be known #expands (0.80) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54
• Neoliberalism is fundamentally an epistemological project, not merely a political or economic one #expands (0.80) — Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste, 900
• Early neoliberalism drew on mathematical conventionalism, not naturalism or empiricism #qualifies (0.75) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 52
• Neoliberalism’s scientific framing made knowledge and truth political questions #expands (0.75) — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 54