Neither law-enforcement nor laws-of-war frameworks can legally justify drone strikes

Evidence

This artistic blurring has puzzled many jurists. They tell politicians they must declare whether it is a matter of war or of legitimate self-defense; they must choose. However, the administration refuses to do that because the consequence of resolving ambiguities in the framework of reference would entail the prohibition of the present drone strikes or would drastically limit their lawfulness. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 537 (#expands, via linked claim)

As the jurist Mary Ellen O’Connell, who describes the present-day drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen as illegal, reminds us: ā€œDrones launch missiles or drop bombs, the kind of weapons that may only be used lawfully in armed conflict hostilities.ā€ The fact is that ā€œthere was no armed conflict on the territory of Pakistan because there was no intense armed fighting between organized armed groups. International law does not recognize the right to kill with battlefield weapons outside an actual armed conflict. The so-called ā€˜global war on terror’ is not an armed conflict.ā€ These strikes therefore constitute grave violations of the laws of war. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 251 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Drones cannot comply with law-enforcement rules because they offer no graded force options — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 542; Choosing a legal framework would render US drone strikes unlawful — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 537; US justifies drone strikes by blending two inconsistent legal paradigms (+3 more)

Broader Connections