Nature’s agency need not be expressed through reason and speech

Evidence

In applying a capabilities approach to nature, we do not need to have a particular animal or ecosystem express a desire for a particular functioning; rather, we need to recognize a different type of agency—a potential, a process, or a form of life illustrated by its history, ecology, way of being, and nonreason-based forms of communication. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 515

Categorization

• XREF: This reframing of agency lets capability theory bridge to the Soundscape reading’s listening-as-method thread: recognizing nature’s agency via observation and non-verbal communication forms. — connects to: Participation of nature is represented through human legal representatives, not direct voice — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 547; Being defined as nature means being passive, non-agent, and claimable land — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 44; Western science dismissed plant communication by measuring plants against animal capacities — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,…, 76
• DEFINE: Defines a non-contractarian notion of agency that lets capability theory extend to nonsentient ecosystems.