Motives of action are linguistically interpreted needs, not unconscious impulses.

Evidence

Since, according to this theory, the structure of language determines likewise both language and conduct, motives of action are also comprehended as linguistically interpreted needs. Thus motivations are not impulses that operate from behind subjectivity but subjectively guiding, symbolically mediated, and reciprocally interrelated intentions. — Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 2682

Categorization

• XREF: Positions Habermas against Freud’s drive theory and against behaviorist models of motivation. — connects to: Motives are freely constituted rather than psychologically forced.; Habitus-driven action is necessary passion, not chosen responsibility. — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:…, 468; Language enables meanings rather than passively carrying them (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Motives are freely constituted rather than psychologically forced. #corroborates (0.85)
• Acts can seem intentional yet lack conscious reason at the moment #contradicts (0.82)
• Habitus-driven action is necessary passion, not chosen responsibility. #contradicts (0.80) — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 468
• Voluntariness concerns the act, intent concerns the motive. #expands (0.80) — Bryan A. Garner, Jeff Newman, Tiger Jackson, The Redbook, 1214
• Performative utterances create states of affairs rather than merely describing them. #expands (0.78) — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 83
• Language enables meanings rather than passively carrying them #expands (0.75)
• People explain actions via inner dispositions rather than situational dynamics #contradicts (0.75) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 426