Modern power is conceptually inseparable from knowledge, making the pairing redundant

Evidence

I therefore dwell at some length on a case study that serves this purpose, namely, the relationship between knowledge and power in the Islamic tradition of premodernity. Through this case study, I argue that certain kinds of knowledge intrinsically do not lend themselves to the use of power, and, conversely, that power—as biopolitical concept of hegemony and force—is useless to them (not to say inimical). This formulation, however, assumes that power has one meaning or structure, which it in fact does not. A modified understanding of power, which is to say, a conception of power from which sovereignty and knowledge-based force are subtracted, would eo ipso dissolve the problem of “power” as modernity conceived it, and thus entirely change the meaning and connotations of the term. This is the case because it is conceptually impossible to view power in the modern and Foucauldian senses as anything other than being organically tied to knowledge. Logically and ontologically, there is no modern power without knowledge, and if this is accepted, as it should be, then our language, in this context at least, is highly redundant. All we need to say is the word “power,” and knowledge is automatically included in the very term, just as the word “mother” must include an unadulterated reference to “daughter,” “son,” or “child,” without whom “mother” is inconceivable. — Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism, 35

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the modern/Foucauldian conception of power as organically tied to knowledge, such that saying ‘power’ already implies ‘knowledge’.
• XREF: Connects to Foucault’s power-knowledge thesis from earlier reading on biopolitics and discipline.