Modern philosophy defines freedom as never becoming habituated to itself

Evidence

The position of the subject as pure and absolute autonomy implies the rejection of habit, which will henceforth lose its Aristotelian significance and stand simply for something mechanical, alien to human freedom. From the point of view of modern philosophy, freedom never becomes habituated to itself. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 627

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s plasticity/enmity work: modern autonomy’s rejection of habit parallels how an enemy figure is rendered plastic or rigid. Also pays off earlier chapters (ch39-75) on Hegelian habit as plasticity. — connects to: Theologians reject negativity inside God just as they rejected negativity within Aristotle’s Prime Mover — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 636
• QUESTION: If modern freedom rejects habituation, does the modern enemy concept inherit this anti-habit structure — making the enemy unfixable by definition, or fixed to the point of inelasticity?