Mind is embodied higher-level cerebral process enabling top-down agency

Evidence

Social cognitive theory adopts a physicalistic conception of human agency (Bandura, 2008). In this view, the mind is considered the embodiment of higher-level cerebral processes rather than a disembodied immaterial entity. … Thoughts are internally generated neural events in a top-down regulation of behavior. Advanced symbolizing capacity, neuronally distributed and richly interconnected to diverse sensory and motor systems, enables humans to function as mindful agents. — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 304

Categorization

• DEFINE: Bandura’s physicalistic yet agentic middle path between epiphenomenalism and dualism: thoughts are neural, but top-down regulatory.
• XREF: connects to: Merleau-Ponty pioneered embodied cognition by centering the body and perception in philosophy — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 1026; Modern embodied cognition research descends from phenomenology’s bodily focus — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 1951; Embodied framing creates meaning and thereby information — Yves Citton, The Ecology of Attention, 539 (+2 more)