Military planners habitually assess new weapons by own use, not adversary use

Evidence

It also is easier to see how a new technology fits into one’s own plans than it is to see how an adversary might use it. The difficult task of discerning the implications of new developments can be made easier by using a framework that the person already understands well—most often his nation’s capacities and intentions. He will have much less information on how the other side might employ the new device and so will pay less attention to this problem or, when he studies it, will implicitly assume that the other side will see it as he does. This was the pattern in many of the Royal Navy’s attempts to grasp the implications of new technologies before World War I. When trying to understand how the torpedo boat would change warfare, both those who urged its adoption and those who denied its importance paid most attention to how it could be used in the close blockade that the Royal Navy planned to institute in the event of war. Little thought was given to how England’s enemies might use torpedo boats to thwart the blockade, a mission that they could in fact perform well (Cowpe, 1977). Similarly, most of the discussion of submarines was in terms of their utility to the British, which was slight. Only a few people shared Lord Balfour’s insight: “The question that really troubles me is not whether our submarines could render the enemy’s position intolerable, but whether their submarines could render our position untenable” (Kennedy, 1977). Some of this effect may be explained by the tendency of military commanders to think in terms of taking the initiative rather than having to react to what the adversary is doing. But probably at least as important is the fact that they can make the problem of judging new weapons less intractable by concentrating on how they could use them rather than trying to guess how the other side might do so, a question about which there is less information and whose answer requires the use of a less familiar mental framework. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2581

Categorization

• SHARE: The Balfour quote about submarines is exactly the kind of thing to send to someone who studies military history or strategy.