Military leaders justified retaining bases through redundancy and strategic denial principles.

Evidence

Even if the military had little interest in using a base or a territory, many military leaders felt the United States should not cede its acquisitions. As justification, they generally invoked two military principles. The first, “redundancy,” says it’s always good to have backups. The second, “strategic denial,” says it’s smart to hold on to bases and territories simply to prevent enemies from using them. — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 84

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clear definitions of ‘redundancy’ and ‘strategic denial’ as base-retention justifications.
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 84
  • XREF: connects to: Postwar base retention was justified by redundancy and strategic denial principles. — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 84; Redundancy and strategic denial drive the military to keep bases it barely uses — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 1715; Two doctrinal principles, redundancy and strategic denial, drive overseas base accumulation. (+1 more)
  • yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: Postwar base retention was justified by redundancy and strategic denial principles. — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 84; Redundancy and strategic denial drive the military to keep bases it barely uses — David Vine, Base Nation_ How U.S. Military Bases…, 1715; Two doctrinal principles, redundancy and strategic denial, drive overseas base accumulation. (+1 more)

Broader Connections