Mild individual in-group preference generates macro segregation spontaneously

Evidence

In a provocative thought experiment in 1971, Thomas Schelling exemplified the segregating implications effected through personal preference expression. (Schelling uses a checkerboard with dimes and nickels though I think the coloring of the chess pieces more provocative.) Take a chessboard: Fill 10 percent of its spaces with black pawns; fill 70 percent of its spaces with white pawns. Assume each black pawn wants at least one neighbor to be a black pawn, and each white pawn wants at least one neighbor to be a white pawn. Segregation sets in within a couple of moves (try it). If each wants both neighbors to be like itself, segregation is produced all the more quickly. — David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race, 383

Categorization

• DEFINE: Schelling’s tipping model is the canonical demonstration that aggregate segregation needs no hostile preferences, only mild in-group affinity.
• SEED: The checkerboard model generalizes mechanically across identity axes — exactly the threatened-privilege generalization test the reader needs: the same preference dynamic that segregates by race also segments by nativity or gender within firms.
• XREF: connects to: A dissimilarity index above 60 signals involuntary segregation, not voluntary clustering — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2426; Mere arbitrary group membership, with no interaction, triggers in-group favoritism — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2704; Even arbitrary group divisions trigger in-group bias and out-group derogation that harm cooperation (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• A dissimilarity index above 60 signals involuntary segregation, not voluntary clustering #complicates (0.85) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2426
• In-group bias operates even when group assignment is arbitrary and trivial #corroborates (0.82) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 545
• Mere arbitrary group membership, with no interaction, triggers in-group favoritism #corroborates (0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2704
• Voluntary segregation processes rarely produce high dissimilarity index values. #contradicts (0.80) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 2422
• Even arbitrary group divisions trigger in-group bias and out-group derogation that harm cooperation #corroborates (0.78)
• Mere division into groups triggers intergroup discrimination even without conflict or self-interest #corroborates (0.78)
• Ingroup preference stems largely from convenience and reduced effort #expands (0.75)