Mere membership in a perpetrating society can cause shameful identity without personal guilt

Evidence

We are also told that guilt is about accepting responsibility for harm to others, but shame is about publicly revealed weakness or a lowering of status (see Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, this volume, Chapter 2). This too is useful. For example, the responsibility that contemporary Whites in the US accept for slavery can hardly be seen as personal responsibility, although upon reflection some do feel personally guilty because they see Whites as responsible for enjoying the fruits of exploitation and the economic results of persistent racism. More might even feel that belonging to the perpetrators’ society, even if their ancestors were not strictly part of the offending group, for example those who migrated more recently, mars their identity. — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 2078

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Legal and moral guilt cannot be inherited, but inherited group guilt feelings can — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1155; Measurement instrument choice drastically changes forgiveness findings — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1375; Perpetrator-group members can benefit from crimes without committing them — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 2066 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Guilt requires self-categorizing as a group member #expands (0.85) — Torsten Masson and Markus Barth, The identification-guilt paradox…, 20
• Mild group identifiers feel guilty when harm is distant and done by others #qualifies (0.75) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 1069