Mehmed Ali believed Egypt’s army was still elementary compared to European militaries

Evidence

Regarding the present situation there are two issues worth thinking of. The first is that the moves of the Europeans are merely a bluff; the second is that the fleets will, in fact, try to intercept our navies. If they are only bluffing then this is exactly what we want … However, you know well that when those who take charge of states and kingdoms confront such issues, they anticipate the worst outcome rather than [simply] hoping for the best. If, therefore, the Europeans are not bluffing … then we have to realize that we cannot stand up against them, and the only possible outcome [if we do so] will be sinking the entire fleet and causing the death of up to 30 or 40 thousand men … Then it will be said that Mehmed Ali Pasha was the cause of this disaster and my name will always be stained with such a disgrace … Taking the responsibility of wasting thirty or forty thousand lives is no easy task. I have, therefore, stopped sending letters to my son encouraging him to fight on. Wars are not won only by depending on God and trusting in Him, but also by putting all possible human effort into it. God has ordered us in His Book [not only] to stand up to the enemy [but also] to spare no effort in confronting him. This, however, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the art of war. Unfortunately, my dear friend, although we are men of war (ehlli harbdan), yet we are still in the A B of that art (alif ba), whereas the Europeans are way ahead of us and have put their theories [about war] into practice … [Contemplating all of this] one thinks of accepting the lesser of two evils, namely, the principle of independence [for the Greeks] and [conducting it through] Austrian mediation. — Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha_s Men_ Mehmed Ali, his…, 238

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: Mehmed Ali’s candid self-assessment — that Egyptian military art was at the ‘alphabeta’ stage while Europeans had operational theories — is a devastating primary-source window into military modernization as perceived from the receiving end. It complicates the narrative of confident reform.
• XREF: Connects to modern debates about why non-European armies lagged — echoes the broader historiography of Ottoman/Egyptian military reform (cf. the nizami reorganization themes in this same book’s earlier chapters).