Marxist judgment of modernism presupposes a personal agency that historical determinism denies

Evidence

This is perhaps the moment to comment on the rejection of modern art and of modernism in general which is implicit in this idea of Lukács. In Kafka’s Castle, after one of the characters has shown K. that all of his actions can be interpreted in a quite different and far more unfavorable light, the hero replies: “It’s not that what you say is false: it’s just that it’s hostile.” Such might be the motto for Lukács’ observations on modern art. It is both diagnosis and judgment: yet the whole dimension of judgment rests on an ambiguity, for it presupposes that the modernist writer has some personal choice in the matter, and that his fate is not sealed for him by the logic of his moment in history. The same ambiguity is visible in Marxist revolutionary theory as well, where the revolution cannot come into being until all the objective conditions are ripe for it, but where at the same time Lenin can apparently force this condition by sheer willpower, can create a proletarian revolution before the preceding middle-class revolution has had time to run its course. — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 398

Categorization

  • XREF: The determinism-vs-will tension mirrors the objective-conditions/subjective-action debate in Lukács and Lenin, and connects to the reader’s Frankfurt-School interest in mediation between base and superstructure. — connects to: Technological determinism substitutes for Marxist historiography by omitting class — Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 161; Both nature’s mechanism and history’s determinism oppress the modern self — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 163; Historical specificity distinguishes Marx’s materialism from vulgar or technological determinism — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 881 (+3 more)

Broader Connections