Marcuse’s early work rested on Dilthey’s meaning-centered, not causal, concept of history

Evidence

In an article titled “The Problem of Historical Reality,” 151 written in 1931, Marcuse praised Dilthey for freeing the Geisreswissenschaften (cultural sciences) from the methodology of the Naturwissenschafien (natural sciences) and for restoring their philosophical foundation. Dilthey’s concept of Leben (life) as the basis of historical reality was insightful, Marcuse argued, because of its stress on meaning rather than causality. Since men make their own history, it is unified by the values they have injected into it. Absent from the article were the criticisms that Horkheimer later leveled at Dilthey concerning his implicit idealism and identity theory, for at this time in his career Marcuse approved of the ontological premise of Dilthey’s concept of history. — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 275

Categorization

• XREF: The Dilthey vs. Horkheimer divergence foreshadows the later chapter on Marcuse’s rupture from Horkheimer — meaning-centered history versus critique of idealism. — connects to: Marcuse’s unsubmitted habilitation read Hegel as anticipating Heidegger and Dilthey — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History…, 276; Horkheimer’s anti-metaphysics grew from Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History…, 205

Broader Connections

• Horkheimer’s anti-metaphysics grew from Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson #expands (0.75) — Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 205