Mafiosi acted as private judges and enforcement guarantors in drug markets

Evidence

The role played by mafiosi as guarantors and dispute settlers is apparent in several instances. Letters intercepted by police show that in the late 1950s a disagreement over the monopoly on processing in Milan between the Mancusos from Alcamo on the one hand and “II Lungo,” Francesco Callace, and Salvatore Vitale on the other was settled by Frank Coppola (Li Causi 1971: 228). In 1960, in another case, a man tried to sell ten kilos of heroin in Palermo on behalf of a French dealer. He sold two and a half kilos to a buyer who promised payment within two hours and promptly disappeared. The seller asked Salvatore Greco for protection; in a letter found by the police at Greco’s home, the man wrote: “We are really in serious trouble and I believe I am turning to a true friend.” Greco declined the job, for he knew the police were monitoring him. The French dealer himself then had to travel to Palermo to look for an intermediary. Finally, Giuseppe Provenzano stepped in. First, he was instrumental in retrieving the stolen drugs (in exchange for 500,000 lire); then he guaranteed the sale of the entire load to the Mancusos (CPM: 75, 451, 419-421). — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 635

Categorization

• XREF: Provenzano retrieving stolen drugs and guaranteeing sale maps directly onto Gambetta’s trust-broker role and Milgrom’s private judge. Greco’s refusal shows the supply constraint on protection.
• ADDENDUM: This is a concrete narrative instance of private third-party enforcement of the kind the ‘law merchant’ literature theorizes — the guarantor guarantees the sale after retrieving stolen goods, bundling restitution and escrow.