Luhmann’s systems are empirical realities, not analytical constructs

Evidence

Although Luhmann calls his theory a systems theory, it is conceptually far removed from the sociological Anglo-American tradition of systems theories. His notion of systems, one cannot over-emphasize, is 1) anything but metaphysical or analytical, and 2) not concerned with structural maintenance, but with highly dynamic meaning-making. Firstly, Luhmann’s conception of the system is not an analytical construct; systems are realworld empirical phenomena. His often quoted statement from the first chapter of his book Social Systems, ‘The following considerations assume that there are systems’, does not mean that systems have an essence-like existence making them readily amenable to identification, description and research. Rather, as he states, ‘the concept of systems refers to something that is in reality a system and thereby incurs the responsibility of testing its statement against reality’. In other words, Luhmann assumes that the reproduction and redundant formation of systems is an empirical reality. He therefore wants to devise sociological concepts whose validity ultimately depends on there being a reality against which they can be tested. He is seeking a close connection with empirical research that can be directed by those concepts. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 20

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies what Luhmann means by ‘systems’ — empirical, dynamic meaning-making, not analytical or structural-maintenance constructs — essential to correctly operationalize his trust theory.