Locke grounded morality in the voluntary action of a sovereign subject

Evidence

Later, Locke attempted to restore a religious foundation to both morality and civil government through the medieval idea of divine law: “The difference between moral and natural good and evil is only this; that we call that naturally good and evil, which, by the natural efficiency of the thing, produces pleasure or pain in us; and that is morally good or evil which, by the intervention of the will of an intelligent free agent, draws pleasure or pain after it, not by any natural consequence, but by the intervention of that power. Thus drinking to excess, when it produces the headache or sickness, is a natural evil; but as it is a transgression of law, by which a punishment is annexed to it, it is a moral evil. For rewards and punishments are the good and evil whereby superiors enforce the observance of their laws; it being impossible to set any other motive or restraint to the actions of a free understanding agent, but the consideration of good or evil; that is, pleasure or pain that will follow from it.” Laws might be sanctioned either by divine or by earthly power, but morality, according to Locke, depended naturally on the voluntary action of a sovereign subject— someone who, having chosen willingly in the knowledge of good and evil, would enjoy or suffer the consequences of his free action. — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 639

Categorization

• XREF: Shows the early-modern contrast between Hobbes’s secular prudential morality and Locke’s attempt to keep a religious foundation — relevant to the book’s overall genealogy-of-the-secular argument. — connects to: Locke’s minimalist state foundation structurally generates the austerity dilemma — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 283; Locke’s natural man is political and moral before property makes him self-interested. — Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s…, 187
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:…, 639