Licensing schemes serve several distinct ends beyond mere revenue collection

Evidence

The reasons which may prompt legislators to exploit the advantages of the technique are numerous. ometimes the purpose may be simply the surd collection of revenue. Advance payment is more dependable than credit, and the requirement of a license affords a ready means of checking upon whether payment has been made. Or the chief purpose may be to facilitate the administration and enforcement of other self-applying provisions. A list of licensees provides an official register of all those who are engaged in a particular occupation and so subject to the general arrangements regulating it; and license applications are an effective vehicle for collecting relevant information. At the same time - as in the Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes - license revocation is made available as an additional and often uniquely effective sanction for violation of the self-applying provisions. Finally, and sometimes in addition to one or more other purposes, the motive may be a genuine or felt need to scrutinize proposed transactions or activities in advance, in order to see whether they should be authorized or permitted. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 757

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to ch5 and ch6 material on legislative purposes and record-keeping functions. — connects to: Prior approval works best when after-the-fact checks would be unjust or inadequate — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 762; Rationing of scarce resources requires mechanisms of prior choice — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 769; Creative Commons spread globally through licensed affiliate organizations rather than legal code changes — Laura Albareda and Alejo Jose G. Sison, Commons Organizing: Embedding Common…, 102

Broader Connections

• Creative Commons spread globally through licensed affiliate organizations rather than legal code changes #exemplifies (0.70) — Laura Albareda and Alejo Jose G. Sison, Commons Organizing, 102