Liberalization reforms market their own outcomes as causes of growth.

Evidence

The basic objection made by late-developing states, such as the countries of East Asia, to the Washington Consensus/Anglo-American idea “liberalize and then growth follows” was twofold. First, this understanding mistakes the outcomes of growth, stable public finances, low inflation, cost competitiveness, and so on, for the causes of growth. Second, the liberal path to growth only makes sense if you are an early developer, since you have no competitors—pace the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century and the United States in the nineteenth century. Yet in the contemporary world, development is almost always state led. — Mark Blyth, Austerity, 378

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the broader Washington Consensus critique and to Mattei’s austerity literature on how growth prescriptions misread causation. — connects to: Development problems are reframed as mere market-access problems. — Max Haiven, Cultures of Financialization, 419
• DEFINE: Defines the late-developer objection to the Washington Consensus: mistaking outcomes for causes, and freeriding on early-developer status.