Leibniz defined an infinite number of unextended soul substances called monads.
Evidence
Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance. His reason was that extension involves plurality, and can therefore only belong to an aggregate of substances; each single substance must be unextended. He believed, consequently, in an infinite number of substances, which he called ‘monads’. Each of these would have some of the properties of a physical point, but only when viewed abstractly; in fact, each monad is a soul. — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2128
Categorization
- corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 2128
- XREF: connects to: For Leibniz, contingency means an infinity of possible alternative selves surrounds each real one; Leibniz originated the question of why anything exists rather than nothing. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café: Freedom,…, 1195; Leibniz derived the monad concept from Anne Conway and Van Helmont via the Cabala. — Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology,…, 990 (+2 more)
Related
- For Leibniz, contingency means an infinity of possible alternative selves surrounds each real one (similarity 0.94)
- Leibniz derived the monad concept from Anne Conway and Van Helmont via the Cabala. (similarity 0.87)
- Leibniz’s vital monads formed a noninteractive cosmos, unlike Renaissance organic relations. (similarity 0.85)